# The client-portal mistake I check for first

> Built a client portal with Lovable, Replit, Bolt, ChatGPT or Claude? The first thing I check is whether one client can open another's files. A test you can run.

Canonical: https://simondziak.com/writing/client-portal-mistake-i-check-first
Last updated: 2026-11-20

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Published Nov 20, 2026 8 min read No Polish version yet

In short

The first thing I check in a client portal built with Lovable, Replit, Bolt, ChatGPT or Claude is whether one client can open another client’s files or invoices, because the screens can look right while the database hands out everything. You can test it yourself with two made-up clients and a private browser window. If the test fails, stop inviting clients until it’s fixed: at App369 the first step is a $450 Launch Check, on Supabase or Firebase, or the $950 Firebase Security Rules Audit + Fix PR if the portal runs on Firebase and who can read what is the only worry.

I founded Workspace369 and App369 and benefit from both businesses.

Before I look at how a client portal looks, I look at who it lets in. In a portal, every visitor is meant to see a different slice of the same data: client A’s invoices, never client B’s. If the design is off, you notice. If the slices leak into each other, you don’t, because the leak shows on a client’s screen and not on yours.

It slips past when the only account you’ve tried the portal with is your own. Signed in as the owner, everything you open is something you’re allowed to see, so the screen gives you no reason to doubt it.

## The check, with two made-up clients

Use test clients, never real ones, on the published portal at the address your clients use, not in the builder’s preview. You don’t need to read any code.

1. **Make two test clients, A and B,** each with its own sign-in. Give each one a file or an invoice with a made-up name you’ll recognize, such as “Test Invoice Apple”.
2. **Sign in as A and copy the address** of A’s file or invoice from the browser’s address bar. If there’s a download button, copy that link too.
3. **Sign in as B and paste each address.** Then search for A’s made-up name, and look at every list and count B can see.
4. **Paste the addresses once more in a private browser window,** where nobody is signed in.

**If it fails.** It fails if B, or the private window, shows anything of A’s: a page, a list entry, the file’s name, the invoice amount, or a count that includes A’s items. A sign-in screen, a blank page or a “not found” message is what you want to see. The one exception is the download link described next. If it fails for B, stop adding files and inviting clients until it’s fixed. If the private window opened a page of A’s and real clients’ files are already in the portal, take the portal offline until it’s fixed, because anyone who has an address can open it without signing in. Taking the screens down may not close the database behind them, so have the access rules checked before it goes back up.

**The one result that isn’t always a fail.** Some file storage gives each file a long download link that ends in a random code, and that link opens for whoever holds it. That is a design choice, not a leak in your portal’s screens. To tell the cases apart, look at what you pasted. If the address opened a page of your portal, it’s a fail. If a download link ends in a file name or an invoice number, with no code after it, it can be guessed, and that’s a fail too. If it only handed over a single file from a link that ends in a long random code, it’s this case. Anyone the link is forwarded to can still open that file, so decide whether that’s acceptable for what your clients upload. An invoice page on your payment provider’s own address is the same case: [Stripe’s documentation](https://docs.stripe.com/invoicing/hosted-invoice-page) says each invoice gets a unique link with a long, random code in it, for you to send to your customer. And if you see A’s file as B, reload the page once before you count it, because a browser can show a copy it saved while A was signed in.

**What a pass doesn’t prove.** The screens decide what B sees. The database’s own access rules decide what anyone gets who asks the database directly, without your screens. A portal can pass all four steps and still hand everything to someone who skips the screens. Supabase and Firebase are services that store an app’s data; in Supabase the access rules are called row-level security, and in Firebase, security rules. Only a check of the rules themselves shows whether they’re closed.

**What to do next.** If the test failed, or passed and you want the rules themselves checked, the first step at App369 is the Launch Check described below, on Supabase or Firebase. If the portal runs on Firebase and who can read what is your only worry, the Firebase Security Rules Audit goes straight to the rules and includes the fixes. Not sure which fits, or built on something else? Check fit by email before you pay; the address is on each offer’s page. [App369’s page for AI-built client portals](https://app369.com/service/fix-ai-built-client-portal/?utm_source=simondziak&utm_medium=essay&utm_campaign=client-portal-mistake-i-check-first) has the longer version of this test and each path with its price.

## One Lovable-hosted app, as The Register reported it

In February 2026, [The Register reported](https://www.theregister.com/2026/02/27/lovable_app_vulnerabilities) a security researcher’s claims about one app hosted on Lovable. The article says the app itself was a platform for creating exam questions and viewing grades. It was not a client portal, but it has the same shape: many people’s records in one app, each meant to be private. By the researcher’s count, 18,697 user records were exposed, and an attacker who wasn’t signed in could “trivially access every user record”. The article puts the cause in general terms: when the builder, AI or human, “fails to explicitly implement crucial security features like Supabase’s row-level security and role-based access”, the code that comes out “looks functional but in reality is flawed”. Its example is an access check written the wrong way round, “essentially blocking authenticated users and allowing access to unauthenticated users”.

The article also carries Lovable’s response, from its chief information security officer, Igor Andriushchenko: “Any project built with Lovable includes a free security scan before publishing,” “Ultimately, it is at the discretion of the user to implement these recommendations. In this case, that implementation did not happen,” and “This project also includes code not generated by Lovable and the vulnerable database is not hosted by Lovable.”

What I take from that example: the first visitor a portal has to turn away is one who isn’t signed in at all, and while you’re signed in you can’t see what that visitor gets. Step 4 above is there for that reason.

_Source: The Register, “Lovable-hosted app littered with basic flaws exposed 18K users, researcher claims”, published February 27, 2026, by Connor Jones, reporting the claims of researcher Taimur Khan. Read November 20, 2026._

## What I do about it at App369

App369 is my app development business in Miami. Two of its fixed-price offers look at exactly this.

**The [AI App Launch Check](https://app369.com/fixed-price/ai-app-rescue/?utm_source=simondziak&utm_medium=essay&utm_campaign=client-portal-mistake-i-check-first)** is **$450**, ready in **3 business days** from read-only access: an invite to your code, a test login, and your database’s structure (for Supabase, a copy with no user data in it; for Firebase, Viewer access to the project). No production keys or passwords. It covers sign-in and roles, data access (Supabase row-level security, policies and grants, or Firebase rules), secret keys shipped to the browser (where any visitor could read them), Stripe payments and deploys, and ranks each issue found by severity with its evidence. The report ends with a fixed quote for the fixes: the Rescue Sprint fixes up to 5 critical or high issues in 7 business days for $1,950, or $1,500 after the $450 credit, and starts only with your yes. It covers the code AI builders produce: React, Next.js or Vite front ends on Supabase or Firebase, with Stripe. If yours is built on something else, check fit by email before you pay; the link is on that page. You can also take the report and fix it yourself.

**The [Firebase Security Rules Audit + Fix PR](https://app369.com/fixed-price/firebase-security-rules-audit/?utm_source=simondziak&utm_medium=essay&utm_campaign=client-portal-mistake-i-check-first)** is **$950**, in **5 business days** from repo access, for Firebase only. It writes down who should read and write each part of your data, by role and by client, then runs a test suite that tries cross-user and cross-client reads and writes against your current rules, and fixes what it finds. Everything runs on the emulator or test data only, never your production records. The emulator is a test copy of Firebase that runs apart from your live app. You get a report ranked by severity and a pull request: a change to your code that you review and put live yourself.

I also build and run [Workspace369](https://app369.com/case-studies/workspace369/?utm_source=simondziak&utm_medium=essay&utm_campaign=client-portal-mistake-i-check-first), which has its own client portal, runs on Firebase, and is live on the web and the App Store. I do all the work myself. The work happens in writing; no call needed.

_Prices as shown on app369.com on November 20, 2026._

## Frequently asked questions

### Can one client see another client’s files in a portal built with AI?

It can, if the database’s access rules are missing or wrong: row-level security in Supabase, or security rules in Firebase. The screens can hide another client’s files while the database still hands them to anyone who asks it directly. At App369, a $450 Launch Check reviews those rules in 3 business days.

### How do I test my client portal without reading code?

Make two test clients, A and B, each with a file. Copy the address of A’s file, then paste it while signed in as B, and again in a private browser window where nobody is signed in. If a page or list of A’s opens, the test fails. A pass doesn’t prove the database is closed; App369’s $450 Launch Check checks the access rules themselves.

### Does Lovable’s security scan catch one client seeing another client’s files?

Lovable says every project gets a free security scan before publishing, and that acting on what it recommends is up to the user. Those are the words of its chief information security officer, Igor Andriushchenko, in The Register’s February 27, 2026 article about one Lovable-hosted app: “Any project built with Lovable includes a free security scan before publishing,” “Ultimately, it is at the discretion of the user to implement these recommendations. In this case, that implementation did not happen,” and “This project also includes code not generated by Lovable and the vulnerable database is not hosted by Lovable.” If you use Lovable, run its scan and act on what it recommends, then run the two-client test as well. At App369, the $450 Launch Check reviews the access rules themselves.

### Is a Firebase portal checked differently from a Supabase one?

The question is the same; the rules are different. Supabase uses row-level security on each table, and Firebase uses security rules on Firestore and Storage. At App369, the $450 Launch Check covers both. If the portal runs on Firebase and who can read what is the only worry, the $950 Firebase Security Rules Audit + Fix PR tests the rules and includes the rule fixes.

## Where to go next

- [You built a client portal with AI. Check that one client can’t see another client’s files.](https://app369.com/service/fix-ai-built-client-portal/?utm_source=simondziak&utm_medium=essay&utm_campaign=client-portal-mistake-i-check-first)
- [AI-built app rescue: the $450 Launch Check](https://app369.com/fixed-price/ai-app-rescue/?utm_source=simondziak&utm_medium=essay&utm_campaign=client-portal-mistake-i-check-first)
- [Firebase Security Rules Audit + Fix PR, $950](https://app369.com/fixed-price/firebase-security-rules-audit/?utm_source=simondziak&utm_medium=essay&utm_campaign=client-portal-mistake-i-check-first)

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